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Administrative Law-Judicial Review of Decisions of the Comptroller

of the Currency
In FirstNat'l Bank of Smithfield v. FirstNat'l Bank of Eastern
North Carolina,1 the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina was faced with the issue of the availability of judicial review of decisions of the Comptroller of the
Currency in passing on applications for the establishment of branch
banks under the provisions of the National Banking Act.2 Acting
under this statute, the Comptroller decided to approve the application of defendant Bank of Eastern North Carolina for permission
to establish a branch bank in Smithfield, North Carolina, in which
city Bank of Smithfield was then engaged in banking operations.
Plaintiff Bank of Smithfield asked the court to enjoin the Comptroller from issuing a certificate of approval and to enjoin the defendant bank from establishing and operating such branch, claiming that the Comptroller had made the decision to approve the application of Bank of Eastern North Carolina without providing
Bank of Smithfield with a hearing as it had requested., Bank of
Smithfield contended that this action of the Comptroller was within
the purview of the judicial review provisions of section 10 of the
Administrative Procedure Act4 and that denial of a hearing in this
action was violative of procedural due process and hence subject
'232 F. Supp. 725 (E.D.N.C. 1964).
' ,.v. STAT. § 5155 (1875), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1958),
which provides in part:
A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, establish and operate new branches: (1) Within
the limits of the city, town or village in which said association is situated, if such establishment and operation are at the time expressly
authorized to State banks by the law of the State in question; and (2)
at any point within the State in which said association is situated, if such
establishment and operation are at the time authorized to State banks
by the statute law of the State in question by language specifically granting such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recognition, and subject to the restrictions as to location imposed by the law
of the State on State banks.
'232 F. Supp. at 727.
'60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958), which provides:
(a) Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any
relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof ....

(c) Every

agency action made reviewable by statute and every final agency action
for which there is no other adequate remedy in any court shall be
subject to judicial review.
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to judicial correction under that act. The court reviewed the decision as requested and held that the Comptroller must, in passing
on applications for permission to open branch banks, afford a hearing to all interested parties.6
Under the opening sentence of section 10 of the act, judicial
review does not lie where "(1) statutes preclude judicial review
7
or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency discretion."
Since the section of the National Banking Act under which the
Comptroller had acted in Bank of Smithfield is silent as to judicial
review,8 the court was concerned only with the second exception
to section 10-i.e., with agency discretion. The precise questions
presented to the court were: (1) Whether the actions of the Comptroller under the establishment of branch banks section of the National Banking Act are committed by law to the discretion of the
Comptroller? (2) Whether, if they are so committed, the actions
of the Comptroller can be reviewed under section 10 at least to the
extent of assuring procedural due process? (3) Was the denial of a
hearing by the Comptroller violative of procedural due process?
'Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C
§ 1009(e) (1958), provides in part:
[T]he reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions ....It shall.., hold unlawful and
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; . . . [or]
law ....

(4) without observance of procedure required by

'232 F. Supp. at 730-31.
760 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958). These exceptions have
caused Professor Davis to comment: "Since these two reasons are the only
reasons why agency action could be unreviewable before the APA was
enacted, the law of reviewability remains unchanged." 4 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE. LAW TREATISE § 28.08, at 33 (1958). See also Luckenbach Steamship
Co. v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 605, 608 (D. Del. 1959). However, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly subscribed to the view expressed by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474
(1951), that the Administrative Procedure Act directs "that courts must now
assume more responsibility for the reasonableness [of] . . . decisions than

some courts have shown in the past." Id. at 490. In Heikkila v. Barber, 345
U.S. 229 (1953), Mr. Justice Clark said for the majority of the Court:
"[T]he broadly remedial purposes of the Act counsel a judicial attitude of
hospitality towards the claim that § 10 greatly expanded the availability of
judicial review." Id. at 232.
'National Banking Act, REv. STAT. § 5155 (1875), as amended, 12
U.S.C. 36(c) (1958), which says only that branch banks may be opened
with the "approval" of the Comptroller of the Currency.
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In the past, courts have been asked to review decisions of the
Comptroller for three general reasons: misinterpretation of law;'
misinterpretation of the facts of the particular case ;o and for abuse
of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness in the finding of fact.11
Although not always relying on the Administrative Procedure
Act for authority, courts have usually reviewed the Comptroller's
conclusions of law in proceedings under the establishment of branch
banks section of the National Banking Act. In Michigan Nat'l Bank
v. Gidney,'2 the court was asked to review a decision of the Comptroller interpreting an ambiguity in the Michigan Financial Institutions Act."3 Without referring to the "conclusiveness" of the
Comptroller's decision, the court sustained his decision, saying: "We
think .. . [the Comptroller's] action was based upon a proper construction of applicable law."' 4 Although the court did not raise any
question as to its jurisdiction to review the interpretation of law
made by the Comptroller, it is evident that the court reached the
'merits of the issue in determining that the Comptroller had correctly interpreted the law.
The Comptroller's interpretation of the Michigan Financial
Institutions Act' 5 as incorporated into the National Banking Act
and the Comptroller's interpretation of the language of the National
Banking Act itself were reviewed in National Bank v. Wayne Oakland Bank.' 6 In this case, the sixth circuit upheld a district court's
'10Suburban
Trust Co. v. National Bank, 211 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.J. 1962).
Community Nat'l Bank v. Saxon, 310 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1962).
"' Ibid.
2237 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 847 (1956).
1L Micn. STAT. ANN. ch. 17, § 23.762 (1957), which provides: "[Any
bank may ... establish and operate a branch or branches within the limits
of the city ... in which said bank is located." Michigan Nat'l Bank arose
from the Comptroller's denying plaintiff bank's application for permission
to open a branch in a city in which plaintiff bank operated a branch but which
was not the city in which plaintiff maintained its main office. The Comptroller ruled that the statute contemplated the city in which the bank maintained its main office. Plaintiff asked the court to review this ruling.
1,237 F.2d at 763.
" Micr. STAT. ANN. ch. 17, § 23.762 (1957), which provides: "Any
bank having a capital of at least $50,000.00 may... [establish branch banks
provided that] no such branch bank shall be established in a city or village
in which a state or national bank or branch thereof is then in operation ...."
10252 F.2d 537 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958). In Wayne
Oakland Bank, the Comptroller notified a national bank of his approval of
their application to open a certain branch. Fourteen days later a state bank
opened a branch in the same town. The Comptroller and the national bank
contended that the national bank could still open its branch on the grounds
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declaratory judgment that it would be unlawful for defendant
national bank to open a certain branch, and upheld the district
court's restraining order directing the Comptroller not to issue a
certificate of approval to the defendant bank for the opening of the
branch. The court held that the "approval" contemplated by the
National Banking Act was a formal certificate and that, contrary
to the Comptroller's contention, a letter from the Office of the
Comptroller to the defendant national bank stating that its application had been approved was insufficient "approval" as contemplated
by the statute.17 The court went on to say: "Whether the rights of
a party are infringed by unlawful action of an individual or by
exercise of unauthorized federal administrative power, it is entitled
to have such controversy adjudicated."'" This statement clearly
indicates that the courts will review an interpretation of law made
by the Comptroller under the establishment of branch banks section
of the National Banking Act.
A district court, in Suburban Trust Co. v. National Bank,-' reviewed the Comptroller's interpretation of a New Jersey banking
statute" as incorporated by reference into the National Banking Act
by saying: "We agree with defendant that the courts may not review discretionary action of the Comptroller. .

.

. However, it is

not true that he may act contrary to the law as the complaints in the
that approval by letter is sufficient "approval" as contemplated by the National Banking Act, and hence the national bank was "established" as contemplated by the Michigan statute before the state branch was in "operation." The state bank asked the court to prevent the issuance of the certificate1 7of "approval" and the opening of the branch.
Id. at 543.
18
Id.at 544.
211 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.J. 1962).
'0N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:19A-19 (1963), which provides:
B. No bank or savings bank shall establish or maintain a branch office
which is located outside the municipality in which it maintains its principal office; except that a bank or savings bank may establish and maintain
a branch office or offices anywhere in the same county as that in which
it maintains its principal office . . . (3) when each proposed branch will

be established in a municipality in which no banking institution has its
principal office or a branch office.
In Suburban Trust Co., the Comptroller approved the application of a national bank for permission to open a branch in Mountainside, N.J., and the
national bank had opened its branch pursuant to the approval. A state bank
which had an earlier approval for a branch in Mountainside but which
had not then opened the branch, asked the court to review the Comptroller's
interpretation of the statutory phrase, "has its principal office or branch
office."
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cases at bar assert, and not have such action reviewable by the
21

courts."

The foregoing discussion illustrates that the courts will review
conclusions of law made by the Comptroller acting under the establishment of branch banks section of the National Banking Act. 2
Faced with a request to review a question of mixed law and fact,2 3
the district court in Community Nat'l Bank v. Gidney24 held that
it was without jurisdiction to order the Comptroller to produce
documents on which his decision was based.25 When requested by
plaintiff, the Comptroller had refused to produce these documents.
The district court based its holding on the view that action by the
Comptroller under the establishment of branch banks section of the
National Banking Act was "by law committed to agency discretion" and therefore within the second exception to the judicial review section of the Administrative Procedure Act, which, in the
opinion of this court, precludes review even for abuse of discretion.20
On appeal,2 7 the sixth circuit, which had decided Wayne Oakland
Bank, affirmed the decision of the district court, but found that the
district court had modified its holding to the extent of ruling that
decisions of the Comptroller under the establishment of branch
banks section were reviewable as to whether the Comptroller's decision " 'was arbitrary or capricious.' ",2' This modification, said the
court of appeals, 9 was made by the district court in ruling on motions
other than that ruled on in the reported opinion."0 The court of ap21211 F. Supp. at 699.
22 ational Bank v. Wayne

Oakland Bank, 252 F.2d 537 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958); Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Gidney, 237 F.2d 762
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 847 (1956); Suburban Trust Co. v.
National Bank, 211 F.Supp. 694 (D.N.J. 1962).
3Defendant national bank's application for permission to establish a
branch bank in an unincorporated but populous area was approved by the
Comptroller on the basis of his determination that the area was a "village"
as contemplated by MicHr. STAT. ANN. ch. 17, § 23.762 (1957), which provides in part: "Any bank .. .may ...

establish and operate a branch or

branches within a village or city other than that in which it was originally
chartered .

. . ."

Plaintiff national bank asked the court to review the

Comptroller's determination that the area was a "village."
F.Supp. 514 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
2"192
2
r Id. at 519.
Ibid.
26

2'Community Nat'l Bank v. Saxon, 310 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1962).
28

225.
modification was not in the opinion as reported in Community
Nat'l Bank v. Gidney, 192 F.Supp. 514 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
20

Id. at

Ibid.

The
so
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peals then held that the issue in controversy" was essentially a
question of fact 32 and that the Comptroller's findings of fact "are
conclusive if reasonably supported by substantial evidence. ' 3 The
court of appeals went on to confirm the district court's modified
opinion that, even under the Administrative Procedure Act, the
courts can review determinations of fact made by the Comptroller
under the establishment of branch banks section of the National
Banking Act only to the extent of determining if the decisions are
3
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 1
A comparison of the district court opinion in Community Nat'l
Bank with the opinion of the court of appeals raises another and
perhaps the most important question involving the availability of
review under the Administrative Procedure Act: to what extent will
the courts limit the discretion of the Comptroller in order to assure
due process? There is an inconsistency between the decisions of
the district and circuit courts in Community Nat'l Bank in that the
circuit court seemed unaware of the full implication of the district
court's denial of plaintiff's motion for production of documents.3 5
This denial rested only on the district court's initial view that a decision of the Comptroller under the establishment of branch banks
section was unreviewable even for abuse of discretion.3 6 The district
court, however, stated that if review had been available, "it would be
anomalous to permit a plaintiff to attack the discretionary act of
the Comptroller because of alleged abuse of discretion and arbitrariness and at the same time prevent such plaintiff from discovering the basis for the Comptroller's action." 37 Although the circuit
court stated that the district court's initial view to the effect that
review of the Comptroller's decision was unavailable even for abuse
of discretion was later modified by the district court, and although
the circuit court itself held that acts of the Comptroller alleged to
be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion were reviewable,
" The issue, whether a certain unincorporated area was a village within
the meaning of a state statute, is discussed in note 23 supra.
Community Nat'l Bank v. Saxon, 310 F.2d 224, 226 (6th Cir. 1962).
"Ibid.
"Ibid.
" Community Nat'l Bank v. Gidney, 192 F. Supp. 514, 519 (E.D. Mich.

1961).

Ibid.
"Ibid. The court continued: "The court is therefore, of the opinion that
a limited production of the documents in issue would not be barred . . . if
the issue of abuse of discretion were properly before the court." Ibid.

396
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it did not discuss the production of documents. Apparently the motion to produce was not reconsidered, causing the very thing the
district court had said would be anomalous-i.e., allowing review
for alleged abuse of discretion in the making of a decision and at the
same time preventing the plaintiff from seeing the documents on
which the decision was based. Apparently, the circuit court in Community Nat'l Bank held that the Comptroller's decision was not
aribtrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, but did not concern
itself with the procedure through which the decision was reached.
Prior to the decision in Bank of Smithfield, courts had held
that interpretations of law made by the Comptroller under authority of the establishment of branch banks section were reviewable
and that the Comptroller's findings of fact were reviewable if alleged to be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. However, until the decision in Bank of Smithfield, the courts had not
reviewed the procedures used by the Comptroller in reaching his
decisions. Thus, the extension made by Bank of Smithfield was not
of the availability of review to be afforded parties adversely affected
by decisions of the Comptroller, but rather was an extension of the
scope of this review to the extent that the Comptroller must "preserve the fundamental fairness characteristic of our system" 8 in
the procedure followed by him in reaching his decisions. In Bank
of Smithfield, the court held that even if the Comptroller's decision
was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, the court
would enjoin the issuance of a certificate of "approval" and enjoin
the opening of the branch until the "approval" was based on a deliberative process in which all parties would be afforded procedural
due process of law. 9 In the words of the court:
[A] dministrative procedure.., must conform to the requirements
of procedural due process of law which requires at least a hearing
after notice and that the findings are supported by substantial
evidence
and that the decision is not arbitrary, capricious, or
illegal.40
With this statement in mind, the court declared:
Any provisions of the National Banking Act that would deny
procedural due process would raise a serious constitutional question. . . . Since an act should be construed as to preserve its
" 232 F.Supp. at 730.
30 Id. at 729.
'Old.at 730.
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constitutionality, it becomes imperative ... to hold that the Administrative Procedure Act is applicable to the Comptroller of
the Currency in proceedings under § 36 of the National Banking
Act.41
As the court expressed it, the Administrative Procedure Act "is sufficiently elastic to provide procedural due process in the administration of the National Banking Act."4 By this ruling, the court in
Bank of Smithfield adopted the doctrine that the Administrative
Procedure Act has remedial purposes which "greatly expanded the
availability of judicial review,"" and implicitly rejected the view
suggested by Professor Davis4 4 and judicially expressed in Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States45 that the Administrative Procedure
Act made no change in the availability of judicial review of administrative decisions. In answer to the Comptroller's contention that
the requirement of a hearing in proceedings under the establishment
of branch banks section " 'would place an impossible administrative
burden on the Comptroller's office as it is now constituted,' "46 the
court said that
any administrative burden incident to due process cannot be
deemed sufficient grounds to deprive parties of constitutional
rights. The Administrative Procedure Act provides a solution.
Section 11 of the Act authorizes the appointment of as many examiners as may be necessary for proceedings incident to the
47
hearings and initial decisions.
The decision in Bank of Smithfield reduces the importance of
the question of whether action by the Comptroller is "by law committed to agency discretion" in that the court said: "If the use of
the word 'approval' is deemed to commit agency action to agency
discretion within the meaning of the second exception to § 10,
nevertheless it must be a sound discretion exercised in a manner
that is not violative of procedural due process. ' 48 With these words,
the court has said that it will not only review decisions reached by
Comptroller under the branch banks section of the National Bank'Id. at 731.
"Ibid.
Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 232 (1953).

"4 DAvis,

ADMINISATIVW LAW TRATisE

"179 F. Supp. 605, 608 (D. Del. 1959).
"232 F. Supp. at 731.
"Ibid.
"8232 F. Supp. at 729-30.

§ 28.08, at 33 (1958).
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ing Act to assure that the decisions are not illegal, arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion, but has gone further to say
that it will assure that the process through which these decisions
are formulated affords all parties procedural due process of law.
The extension of the scope of review made by Bank of Smithfield
seems desirable in that conformance to procedural due process, including notice, hearing, and an opportunity for all parties to introduce and examine evidence, is necessary to formulate a complete
record of the Comptroller's deliberations; and a complete record is
the only adequate basis on which a court can subsequently review
the decisions for arbitrariness, capriciousness, or abuse of discretion. By using the Administrative Procedure Act as authority
for granting this new remedy to those deprived of procedural due
process in proceedings of the Comptroller, the court seems to be
applying the act in the spirit in which the United States Supreme
Court has said it should be applied.4"
RALPH JACOBS

Constitutional Law-Dismissal of Jury after judge Coerces Guilty
Plea Constitutes Reversible Error-Retrial thereafter Is
Not Double jeopardy
Tateo was brought to trial before a jury in a federal court on
four counts of bank robbery and one of kidnaping. On the fourth
day of the trial, the judge informed Tateo's counsel that if Tateo
insisted on continuing with the trial through the jury verdict and
was convicted, sentencing would be arranged so that Tateo would be
imprisoned for the rest of his life.1 Tateo was notified of these
statements and warned by his counsel that the probability of conviction was high. Accordingly, he changed his plea to guilty. The
plea was accepted, and the jury dismissed. The judge then sentenced
Tateo to twenty-two years and six months in prison.2
" See Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 232 (1953).
1 Tateo's attorney later testified, unchallenged by the Government, that
the trial judge had stated: "I think I ought to tell you this. If you finish the
trial and your clients are found guilty, I'm going to start off by imposing
a life sentence on the kidnapping charge and then I'm going to add consecutive maximum sentences on the other counts on which they are found
guilty." United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). At
this later hearing, Tateo testified that he was unaware that the judge was unable to impose consecutive sentences. Ibid.
'At the time the sentence was imposed the prosecution agreed to defendant's motion of dismissal of the kidnaping count. Id. at 562.

